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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Petitioner was convicted of retail theft while armed

with a dangerous weapon, a crime against property, and aggravated
assault, a crime against a person.
same criminal episode.

Both crimes occurred in the

Is it constitutionally proportionate to

sentence petitioner to 1 to 15 years for the retail theft while
sentencing him to 0 to five years for the aggravated assault?
2.

Was exclusion of expert testimony as to eyewitness

identification proper considering the identification was made
nine and one half months after the offense!?

REFERENCE TO REPORTS OF THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 140 Utah
Adv. Rep. 10.

GROUNDS OF JURISDICTl6N
The decision sought to be reviewed was entered July 13, 1990
in the Utah Court of Appeals.

An order extending the time to

file a petition for writ of certiorari until September 12, 1990
was entered in this court on August 13, 1990.

Utah Code Ann.

Section 78-2a-4 provides for review of Utah Court of Appeals
decisions by petition of writ of certiorari to the Utah Supreme
Court.
CONTROLLING STATUTES
U.S.C.A. Const, amend. VIII
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
1

imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted.
Utah Const, art. I. Section 9
Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines shall
not be

imposed: nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be

inflicted.

Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated

with unnecessary rigor.
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-412(1)(a)(iii)
Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter
shall be punishable as a second degree felony if the actor is
armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was on put on trial on the 7th and 8th days of
March, 1989, before a jury for the charges of Retail Theft,
Possession of a Concealed Weapon and Aggravated Assault.

The

case against defendant was based on eyewitness testimony by two
security officers for Sears, Officer Dial, whose testimony goes
from page 3 to 69 of the trial transcript, and Officer Maddox,
whose testimony goes from page 70 to page 96 of the transcript,
and a videotape of the perpetrator, introduced into evidence on
page 67 of the trial transcript.

Officer Dial arrested the

defendant nine and one half months after the commission of the
offense.
between

Page 60 of the trial transcript.
the

incident

and

arrest,

Officer

During the time
Dial

viewed

the

videotape of the perpetrator somewhere between 30 and 50 times.
Page 36 of the trial transcript.
2

Defendant sought to have Edward Bartdn testify as an expert
witness

as

to

eyewitness

identification,

and

a

proffer

evidence was made, pages 116 to 136 of the transcript.

of

The trial

judge granted the prosecution motion to exclude the testimony of
Mr. Barton.

Page 143 to 145 of the transcript.

Defendant was convicted on all counts.

Page 164 and 165 of

the trial transcript.
An appeal was taken to the Utah Court of Appeals on the
basis that the expert testimony as to eyewitness identification
was improperly excluded, that the conviction of possession of a
concealed weapon was a duplication of the conviction for retail
theft while armed with a dangerous weapon, and that the sentence
of

1

to

15

years

for

the

retail

theft

conviction

was

disproportionate to the point of unconstitutionality. See the
statement of the issues in Appellant's brief before the Court of
Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction for possession
of a concealed weapon and upheld the trial court on the other
matters brought before it on appeal.

Pag^s 5, 10, 11 and 12 of

the Court of Appeals Opinion as included in the appendix.

ARGUMENTS
1.

The Constitutions of both the United States of America

and the State of Utah require that punishment for crime be
proportionate to the offense.
The 8th Amendment to the United States Constitution and
3

Section 9 of Article 1 of the Utah Constitution prohibit cruel
and unusual punishment.

Encompassed within the concept of cruel

and unusual punishment is the concept of proportionality of the
offense to punishment.

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct.

3001, 77 L.Ed. 2d 637 (1983) and State v. Bishop. 717 P.2d 261
(Utah 1986).

Factors to consider in determining proportionality

of an offense to the punishment include the gravity of the
offense and the harshness of the penalty.

Bishop at 269.

In

general, it is accepted that murder is more serious than other
crimes and that crimes against persons are more serious than
crimes against property, and that crimes of violence are more
culpable than those that do not involve violence. Bishop at 269.
Accordingly, violent crimes against persons should be punished
more

severely

conversely,

than non-violent
non-violent

crimes

crimes

against

against

property; and

property

should

be

punished less severely than violent crimes against persons.
2.

Issues of proportionality of punishment can arise as to

different offenses within one criminal episode.
The Court of Appeals upheld the defendant's convictions for
retail

theft

and

aggravated

assault

while

reversing

conviction for carrying a concealed dangerous weapon.

his

See the

bottom paragraph on page 10 of the typewritten opinion attached
in the appendix.
present

statutory

According to a strict application of the
scheme of the state of Utah, because the

perpetrator was armed with a deadly weapon in this case, the
retail theft conviction is a Second degree felony carrying a
4

penalty of 1 to 15 years in the state prison.
606 and U.C.A. 76-6-412(1)(iii).

U.C.A. Sec. 76-6-

Without the complications of

the dangerous weapon, the crime would

have been a class B

misdemeanor because the value of the merchandise taken was less
than $100.00.

(The value of the merchandise taken was $29.98.

Trial transcript on page 30.)

The aggravated assault was a

felony of the third degree, punishable by 0 to 5 years in the
state

prison.

(The

aggravated

assault

consisted

of

the

perpetrator pointing a handgun at the store security officers.
Pages 21-22 and 76-79 of the trial transcript.)
The

disproportionality

of the punishment

for these two

offenses, which arose in the same episode, constitutes the basis
for this petition for review.

The Court of Appeals did not

consider the interplay of the different otfenses in this matter
when they considered the proportionality t>f the punishment. Page
11 of the opinion attached in the appendix.
3.

The nonviolent offense against property in this matter

is being punished more severely than the violent crime against
persons.
The

strict

application

of

the

Statutorily

prescribed

sentences leads to the result that defendant is punished more for
a non-violent crime against $29.98 worth of light switches than
for

a

violent

merchandise

was

crime

against

already

two

returned

aggravated assault occurred.

security
to

the

officers.

officers

when

The
the

Page 20 of the trial transcript.

The punishment is therefore disproportionate according to the
5

guidelines from Bishop that crimes against persons be punished
more severely

than crimes against property

and that violent

crimes be punished more severely than non-violent crimes.
4.

Changing the classification of retail theft of less than

$100 from a Class B misdemeanor to a Second Degree felony due to
possession of a deadly weapon is permissible only because of the
potential that a crime against property could easily change into
a crime against a person.
The Court of Appeals in its opinion correctly states that
retail theft while armed with a deadly weapon is a grave offense.
Page 11 of the attached opinion.

The gravity of the offense is

caused by the potential that the weapon could easily be directed
against a person during the commission of the offense.

No other

justification can be made for the change of classification.
5.

Once the aggravated

assault was committed

in this

matter, there was no longer any justification to treat the retail
theft as a second degree felony.
Because the weapon was directed against persons, there no
longer remained any potential that it might be directed against
persons.

The potential became a reality.

potential that it would harm a person.

There only existed a
Which potentiality is

contemplated by the crime of assault and punished as part of the
crime of assault.

Accordingly, punishment of the theft as a

felony is disproportionate.
6.

The length of time between the offense and the arrest

gives rise to circumstances mandating the admission of expert
6

testimony as to eyewitness identification.
In recent years, there has been a growing acknowledgment
that

eyewitness

thought.

identification

Although

is

not

as

reliable

as

once

the Court did approve a cautionary jury

instruction in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), that step
did not go far enough to counter public misperceptions as to
eyewitness identification.
Because of the length of time between the incident and the
arrest(9 1/2 months), and the fact that the arresting officer
had viewed the videotape some 30 to 50 times in the interim,
possibly causing a situation where the officer was making an
identification

from

the

videotape

recollection of the actual

rather

than

from

incident, expert testimony

his

as to

eyewitness identification was crucial to protect the right of
defendant to a fair trial.

CONCLUSION
When viewing the separate offenses that the defendant has
been convicted of as one episode, the sentences for the two
offenses are not constitutionally proportionate with respect to
each other.

Considering the two as one episode also removes the

justification to treat the retail theft conviction as a felony
conviction.

The retail theft conviction must be changed to a

Class B misdemeanor with a corresponding change of sentence.
Because the eyewitness identification at defendant's trial
was tainted by the passage of time and the possible replacement
7

of visual recollection with a black and white video image, expert
testimony was needed to protect the interests of defendant in
having a fair trial.
Dated this 12th day of September, 1990.

Evan Hurst

Certificate of service
I certify that I hand-delivered four copies of the foregoing
petition, postage—pif*'f^4-4T—f irist-rl aff^ mail this 12th day of
September, 1990, to:

Paul Van Dam
Sandra Sjogren
Barbara Bearnson
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Evan R. Hurst
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APPENDIX

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
^ V * of *« Court

ooOoo
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Charles Louis Kinsey,

Case No. 890296-CA

Defendant and Appellant.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable David S. Young
Attorneys:

Evan R. Hurst, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Barbara Begrnson, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee

Before Judges Garff, Jackson, and Newey.1
GARFF, Judge:
Defendant Charles Louis Kinsey appeals his convictions of
retail theft, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-602(1) (Supp. 1989); aggravated assault, a third
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp.
1989); and carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, a class B
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (Supp.
1989). We affirm in part and reverse in part.
On December 9, 1987, Wayne Dial, a Se^lt Lake County
sheriff's deputy who was also working as a [security guard at
Sears, observed and recorded on a closed-circuit television
security system a man, dressed in a black Waist-length jacket,
a green military fatigue-style shirt, blue jeans, and a black
1. Robert L. Newey, Senior Juvenile Court Judge, sitting by
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10)
(Supp. 1989).

nylon web belt, walking through the store carrying electrical
items. Dial observed the man enter the men's restroom carrying
the electrical items and then exit without the electrical items
in his hands. Dial notified another security officer, Tim
Maddox, that a possible theft was in progress and that the
suspect was leaving the store. Dial left the video monitor and
pursued the suspect.
Outside, Dial confronted the suspect, identified himself
as a security agent for Sears, and told him that he wanted to
talk with him about the items he took from the store.
Meanwhile, Maddox joined Dial.
The suspect handed Dial two
electrical items, valued at $29.98 and packaged in Sears
containers. Dial then searched the suspect and asked if he had
any weapons. The suspect broke away from Dial and pulled a
large-caliber handgun from a holster concealed underneath his
jacket. The suspect held the gun in combat position and
pointed it back and forth at Dial and Maddox for three to five
seconds. He then ran into a nearby mall entrance and escaped.
At the time of this incident, the weather was bright and
sunny, and neither Dial nor Maddox were impaired in observing
the suspect.
After the incident, Dial made extensive efforts to locate
the suspect. He viewed the videotape of the theft several
times, went through files of those licensed to carry concealed
weapons, and showed the videotape to numerous other law
enforcement officers. Maddox also saw the videotape a number
of times.
Nearly a year later, on September 26, 1988, Dial, who
also worked as a security guard for Harmon's grocery store,
was beginning his shift when he saw Kinsey and immediately
recognized him as the suspect. Kinsey was wearing a green
military fatigue-style shirt, blue jeans, and a black nylon web
belt. Dial arrested him.
Kinsey was subsequently charged with retail theft,
possession of a concealed weapon, and aggravated assault.
was tried before a jury on March 7 and 8, 1989.

He

During trial, Kinsey claimed that he was innocent and the
victim of mistaken identity. He testified that he did not know
what he did on December 9, 1987, but denied having gone to
Sears or having committed the theft. Both Dial and Maddox,
however, positively identified Kinsey as the suspect. The

890296-CA
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prosecution showed the videotape of the theft to the jurors,
Kinsey unsuccessfully sought to introduce the testimony of
Edward M. Barton, an expert on eyewitness identification.
Following the presentation of the evidence and at the request
of both parties, the trial court gave a cautionary instruction
on eyewitness identification to the jury.
The jury found Kinsey guilty on all three charges. On
April 7, 1989, he was sentenced to the following concurrent
sentences: one to fifteen years for retail theft, up to five
years for aggravated assault, and up to six months for carrying
a concealed weapon.
Kinsey brought this appeal, raising the following
issues: (1) Is a cautionary instruction bufficient when
eyewitness identification is an issue in a criminal case? (2)
Did the trial court err in excluding Kinsey1s proffered expert
testimony as to eyewitness identification? (3) Was Kinsey
improperly convicted and sentenced twice for the same act? (4)
Is punishment of one to fifteen years proportionate to the
theft of merchandise valued at less than $30?
I.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE CAUTIONARY JURY INSTRUCTION

Kinsey argues that a cautionary jury instruction listing
criteria for a jury to consider in evaluating eyewitness
identification testimony is insufficient because of the
limitations inherent in eyewitness identification. Kinsey,
therefore, concludes that the trial court erred in excluding
his proffered expert testimony concerning these limitations.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that there are
inherent weaknesses in eyewitness identification, and that
jurors are, for the most part, unaware of these weaknesses.
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488-91 (Utah 1986). Therefore,
trial courts are required to give a cautionary instruction when
eyewitness identification is a central iss\ie in the case and
the defense requests such an instruction. Id. at 492.
However, contrary to Kinsey1s argument, the supreme court has
not extended the cautionary instruction requirement to include
additional expert testimony concerning eyewitness
identification.
It is generally held that the trial court has discretion
to determine the suitability of expert testimony in a case.
Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., 781 P.2d 445, 447 (Utah Ct. App.

890296-CA
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1989). The trial court may exclude even relevant expert
testimony if "its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
Utah R. Evid. 403.
As a corollary, "whether expert testimony should be
allowed as to the merits of eyewitness identification is within
the discretion of the trial court." State v. Malmrose, 649
P.2d 56, 61 (Utah 1982). 2 Although a defendant has a right
to have witnesses, including experts, testify in his or her
behalf, such expert testimony, which is applicable to any crime
and does not deal with the specific facts of the defendant's
case, is in the nature of a lecture to the jury as to how it
should judge the evidence. State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478, 481
(Utah 1981). A trial court's conclusion that expert testimony
would amount to such a lecture, and its subsequent refusal to
admit such testimony into evidence, is not an abuse of
discretion. Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 61. This is particularly
true where there has been no showing that the excluded expert
testimony would probably have had a substantial influence in
bringing about a different verdict. Id.
Kinsey's proffered expert witness, Edward M. Barton,
testified that he was not familiar with either the defendant or
the facts of this case, and admitted that his testimony would
be in the form of a lecture to the jury with regard to
eyewitness identification in general. Kinsey did not show that
the proffered testimony would have had a substantial influence
in bringing about a different verdict. Therefore, we conclude
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
Kinsey's proffered expert testimony regarding eyewitness
identification.
In setting guidelines for a proper eyewitness
identification instruction, the Utah Supreme court stated that
a proper instruction should sensitize the
jury to the factors that empirical
research have shown to be of importance in
determining the accuracy of eyewitness
identifications . . . [including] not only
2. State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982), is a pre-Long
case, but because the Long holding only dealt with the issue of
cautionary instructions regarding eyewitness identification, it
does not extend to this issue.

890296-CA
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the externals, like the quality of the
lighting and the time available for
observation, but also the internal or
subjective factors, such as the likelihood
of accurate perception, storage and
retrieval of the information by a
witness. For example, an instruction
should address the following commonly
accepted areas of concern: (1) the
opportunity of the witness to view the
actor during the event; (2) the witness's
degree of attention to the actor at the
time of the event; (3) the witness's
capacity to observe the event, including
his or her physical and mental acuity; (4)
whether the witness's identification was
made spontaneously and remained consistent
thereafter, or whether it was the product
of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the
event being observed and the likelihood
that the witness would perceive, remember
and relate it correctly. This last area
includes such factors as whether the event
was an ordinary one in the mind of the
observer during the time it was observed,
and whether the race of the actor was the
same as the observer's.
Long, 721 P.2d at 492-93. Our examination of the trial court's
instruction^ convinces us that the instruction fully complied
with the standards set forth in Long. Therefore, we conclude
that the trial court acted properly in refusing to admit the
proffered expert testimony and in instructing the jury.
3. The trial court gave the following eyewitness
identification instruction:

In judging the weight of the
testimony and credibility of eyewitnesses
testifying to the identity of the person
who committed an alleged crime, you are
instructed that identification testimony
is an expression of belief or impression
by the witness.

890296-CA
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II.

CONVICTION TWICE FOR THE SAME ACT

Kinsey maintains that he was improperly convicted of
and sentenced for two offenses which involved one act: retail
theft, which became a second degree felony because of his
possession of a deadly weapon at the time of the theft, and
carrying a concealed weapon.
(Footnote 3 continued)
Many factors affect the accuracy of
identification. In considering what weight
to give the testimony of an identifying
witness, you should consider the following:
1. Did the witness have an adequate
opportunity to observe the criminal actor?
In answering this question, you may consider:
a.

the length of time the witness
observed the actor;

b.

the distance between the witness
and the actor;

c.

the extent to which the actor's
features were visible and
undisguised;

d.

the light or lack of light at the
place and time of observation;

e.

the presence or absence of
distracting noises or activity
during the observation;

f.

any other circumstances affecting
the witness1 opportunity to
observe the person committing the
crime.

2. Did the witness have the capacity
to observe the person committing the crime?
In answering this question, you may
consider whether the witness1 capacity was
impaired by:

890296-CA
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The principal test for determining whether an offense
is a lesser included offense involves a comparison of the
statutory elements of each crime. State v. Larocco, 135 Utah
Adv. Rep. 16, 18 (1990). An offense is included in the
charged offense when "it is established by proof of the same
(Footnote 3 continued)
a.

stress or fright at the
time of observation;

b.

personal motivations,
biases or prejudices;

c.

uncorrected visual defects;

d.

fatigue or injury;

e.

drugs or alcohol.

You may also consider whether the
witness is of a different race phan the
criminal actor. Identification by a
person of a different race may be less
reliable than identification by a person
of the same race.
3. Was the witness sufficiently
attentive to the criminal actor at the
time of the crime?
In answering this question, you may
consider whether the witness knew that a
crime was taking place during the time he
or she observed the actor. Even if the
witness had adequate opportunity and
capacity to observe the criminal actor, he
or she may not have done so unless he or
she was aware that a crime was being
committed.
4. Was the witness* identification
of the defendant completely the product of
his or her own memory?
In answering this question, you may
consider:

890296-CA
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or less than all the facts required to establish the
commission of the offense charged," Duran v. Cook, 788 P.2d
1038, 1039 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-1-402(3) (1978)); see also Larocco, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. at
17. Thus, we need to determine whether Kinsey could have
committed second-degree-felony retail theft without
necessarily having committed the offense of carrying a
concealed weapon. See State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 877
(Utah 1985) (per curiam).
(Footnote 3 continued)

890296-CA

a.

the length of time that passed
between the witness1 original
observation and his or her
identification of the defendant;

b.

the witness1 mental capacity and
state of mind at the time of the
identification;

c.

the witness' exposure to opinions,
descriptions or identifications given
by other witnesses, to photographs or
newspaper accounts, or to any other
information or influence that may
have affected the independence of his
or her identification;

d.

any instances where the witness, or
any eyewitness to the crime, failed
to identify the defendant;

e.

any instances when the witness, or
any eyewitnesses to the crime, gave a
description of the actor that is
inconsistent with the defendant's
appearance;

e.

the circumstances under which the
defendant was presented to the
witness for identification.

f.

Was the witness1 identification of
the defendant corroborated by other
evidence?

8

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1989), a
person commits second-degree-felony retail theft when he
commits retail theft as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602(1)
(Supp. 1989) 4 , and "[the] value of the property or services
(Footnote 3 continued)
You may take into account that an
identification made by the defendant from
a group of similar individuals is
generally more reliable than an
identification made from the defendant
being presented alone to the witness.
The burden of proving that the
defendant is the person who committed the
crime is on the prosecution. If, after
considering all the evidence you have
heard from the prosecution and from the
defense, including evaluating the
eyewitness testimony in light of the
considerations listed above, you must find
him not guilty.
If, on the other hand, you have no
such reasonable doubt as to his identity,
and you find all of the other elements of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must find him guilty.
4. The elements of retail theft are set forth in Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-602(1) (Supp. 1989):
A person commits the offense of retail theft
when he knowingly:
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries
away, transfers or causes to be carried away
or transferred, any merchandise displayed,
held, stored or offered for sale in a retail
mercantile establishment with the intention of
retaining such merchandise or with the
intention of depriving the merchant
permanently of the possession, use or benefit
of such merchandise without paying the retail
value of such merchandise . . . .

890296-CA
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stolen exceeds $1,000; . . • [the] property stolen is a firearm
or an operable motor vehicle; or . . . [the] actor is armed
with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft." Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-419 (1978). A person commits the crime of carrying a
concealed dangerous weapon, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-504 (Supp. 1989), a class B misdemeanor, by carrying a
concealed dangerous weapon.
Kinsey took electrical goods with a value of $29.98
while armed with a deadly weapon. The only reason his offense
was a second degree felony was because of his possession of the
weapon. Evidence that Kinsey was carrying a concealed weapon
during the theft, which he took out of concealment and used
during the aggravated assault, was used to establish the
elements of all three offenses of which he was convicted.
A secondary test is required where crimes standing in a
greater-lesser relationship have multiple variations so that a
greater-lesser relationship exists between some variations but
not between others. Larocco, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18;
Bradley, 752 P.2d at 877. This test requires the court to
consider the evidence in determining whether the greater-lesser
relationship exists between the specific variations of the
crimes actually proven at trial. State v. Young, 780 P.2d
1233, 1240-41 (Utah 1989). In the present case, the variation
of second-degree-felony retail theft at issue, being armed with
a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense, results
in a greater-lesser relationship between second-degree-felony
retail theft and carrying a concealed weapon because possession
and use of a concealed weapon was shown to establish both
offenses.
Where two crimes are such that the greater cannot be
committed without necessarily having committed the lesser, the
defendant cannot be convicted or punished for both. State v.
Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); see also Bradley,
752 P.2d at 877; State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896, 900 (Utah
1986). He may be convicted of the offense charged or an
offense included in the offense charged, but not both. Duran,
788 P.2d at 1039. Therefore, Kinsey should not have been
convicted of both crimes. See Larocco, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. at
18. M[W]hen a defendant has been improperly convicted of both
the greater and the included offense, the conviction on the
included offense is treated as mere surplusage and the
conviction of the greater offense remains unaffected."
Bradley, 752 P.2d at 877. Therefore, we reverse Kinsey's
conviction of the lesser included offense, carrying a
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concealed weapon, but affirm his conviction for second degree
felony retail theft.
III.

PROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT

Kinsey alleges that his sentence of one to fifteen
years is so disproportionate to the offense of the theft of
$29.98 in merchandise as to be unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court has held that a criminal sentence
must be proportionate to the crime for whibh the defendant has
been convicted. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 S. Ct.
3001, 3009-10 (1983). However, reviewing Courts should grant
substantial deference to the broad authority given
legislatures to determine the types of punishments for crimes
and to the broad discretion granted trial courts for
sentencing convicted criminals, id. at 290, 103 S. Ct. at
3009. In so doing, the reviewing court should look first to
the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty,
and then compare the sentences imposed on other criminals
first in the same and then in other jurisdictions. Id. at
292, 103 S. Ct. at 3011; State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 269
(Utah 1986).
Defendant argues that his conviction of second degree
retail theft was for the theft of $29.98 worth of merchandise,
for which he received one to fifteen years of imprisonment.
Defendant errs in minimizing his offense: he was convicted of
second degree retail theft for the theft of $29.98 worth of
merchandise and being armed with a deadly weapon in the course
of the theft. While the dollar amount of the merchandise is
relatively insignificant, and for which the one to fifteen
year sentence would, indeed, be disproportionate, being armed
with a deadly weapon during the commission of the crime, a
grave offense, is not insignificant. Under Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-412(a)(iii) (Sunp. 1989), all theft offenses in which
the actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the
theft are classified as second degree felonies. Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-203(2) (Supp. 1989) specifies that a person
convicted of a second degree felony may be sentenced to
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of "not less than one
year nor more than 15 years." "Only rarely will a statutorily
prescribed punishment be so disproportionate to the crime that
the sentencing statute is unconstitutional." Bishop, 717 P.2d
at 269. We find that the penalty is not harsh in relationship
to the gravity of the crime and that it necessarily compares
with sentences given other defendants charged with possession
of a weapon during the commission of a theft. We do not find
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the statutorily prescribed punishment to be unconstitutional
in thisx^-rSslTNand, so, find g^nsey's argument to be without
merij
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Regnal W. Garff, Judge/ //
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WE CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackson, Judge
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Robert L. Newey, i^udqe
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